The Tennessee Supreme Court has ruled that private employers can lawfully terminate at-will employees for contacting legislators, finding that the constitutional right to petition applies only to government action and does not create a public policy exception to the state’s employment-at-will doctrine.
The decision came in a case involving H.S., a former employee of BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, who alleged she was wrongfully terminated after emailing members of the Tennessee General Assembly to express concerns about the company’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The court reversed a lower appellate ruling and upheld the dismissal of her lawsuit, affirming that the right to petition under Article I, Section 23 of the Tennessee Constitution cannot be enforced against private parties.
“We hold that Article I, Section 23 is enforceable only against the government, not against private actors; consequently, private employers do not violate a clear public policy by terminating employees for exercising the right to petition,” the court wrote.
Employee emailed lawmakers over vaccine mandate
H.S. began working at BlueCross in 2014. In 2021, during the COVID-19 pandemic, the nonprofit insurer announced that all public-facing employees were required to be vaccinated. Although H.S. was not in a public-facing role, her managers told her that, “as leaders, we are expected to follow the mandate.”
H.S. requested a religious accommodation, which BlueCross initially denied. After further discussion, the company granted her a 30-day extension, which it characterized as an accommodation, and she transferred into a role that was not subject to the mandate.
On Oct. 27, 2021, the Tennessee General Assembly held a special session on COVID-19-related issues. That same day, H.S. emailed several state legislators, sharing her personal concerns about vaccine mandates and requesting legislative intervention. One of the legislators read her message aloud in a committee meeting, and another forwarded it to BlueCross.
On Nov. 3, BlueCross told H.S. her email violated the company’s social media policy. The next day, BlueCross expanded its vaccination policy to include all employees. That same day, H.S. sent a second email to legislators, emphasizing she was speaking in her personal capacity. This message was also forwarded to BlueCross. The following day, BlueCross terminated her employment.
Lawsuit claims termination violated public policy
H.S. sued BlueCross for retaliatory discharge, arguing that her termination violated public policy under the Tennessee Constitution’s right to petition provision. She contended that Article I, Section 23 guaranteed her the right to communicate with lawmakers “unhindered,” and that terminating her for doing so amounted to a violation of clear public policy.
The trial court dismissed her case, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the right to petition was a public policy exception to at-will employment. The Supreme Court disagreed and reinstated the dismissal.
Court: Right to petition limits government, not private employers
In its analysis, the court emphasized the long-standing doctrine of employment at will in Tennessee, which allows either party to terminate employment at any time, for any reason or no reason at all, barring exceptions grounded in clear public policy.
While Tennessee law recognizes a narrow exception for retaliatory discharge, the court noted that such claims are limited to violations of “clearly established public policy” rooted in “unambiguous constitutional, statutory, or regulatory provision[s].”
The court concluded that the right to petition, while fundamental, is designed to protect citizens from government retaliation—not to constrain the actions of private employers.
“For hundreds of years, the constitutional right to petition has been considered a bulwark against government oppression, not a constraint on private parties,” the court wrote.
The justices also observed that no state has recognized the right to petition as enforceable against private employers in the context of wrongful discharge.
No expansion of public policy exception
H.S. argued that the language of Article I, Section 23—which states, “That the citizens have a right, in a peaceable manner, to assemble together… and to apply to those invested with the powers of government for redress of grievances”—suggests a broader scope than the federal First Amendment. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, it does not expressly restrict only government actions.
The court rejected this interpretation, finding that the text does not “mandate” a different reading, and that constitutional rights must be analyzed in their historical context.
“Nothing in this history indicates the framers envisioned [the right to petition] as enforceable against private parties,” the court said.
Moreover, the court found no support for expanding the retaliatory discharge exception based on the petition right. Such a move, it said, would risk undermining the entire at-will employment doctrine.
“Despite the right to petition having been in existence for centuries, [the plaintiff] does not point to a single case—in any state—permitting a retaliatory discharge claim against a private employer based on the employee’s exercise of the constitutional right to petition,” the court said.
Court sides with employer
The court held that BlueCross did not violate any enforceable public policy by terminating H.S.’s employment, even assuming the factual allegations in her complaint were true.
It ruled that Article I, Section 23 “cannot be the basis for a ‘public policy’ exception to the employment-at-will doctrine as against private employers,” and concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted.
For more information, see https://cases.justia.com/tennessee/supreme-court/2025-e2022-01058-sc-r11-cv.pdf?ts=1742999958
